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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COM-
PANY and TELLURIDE POWER 
CO:JIPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION OF UTAH and NEPHI 
CITY, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7803 
Brief of Defendant Nephi City 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Nephi City applied to the Public Service Commis-
sion of Utah for an order directing the Utah Power & 
Light Company to sell power to the city of Nephi. The 
point where Nephi ;as ·to take ·the power was ·at the 
nearest point where Utah Power's facilities were ade-
quate to serve Nephi. Utah Power did not file any 
protest to this application, nor d"id it raise any objection 
at the hearing. The Telluride Power Company inter-
Yened and protested. After the P.S.C. ordered Utah 
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Power to sell to Nephi, both Utah Power and Telluride 
filed petitions for rehearing. As a result of these peti-
tions for rehearing, an amended order directing Utah 
Power to sell to Nephi was entered. Both Telluride and 
Utah Power instituted these proceedings to have the 
correctness of the order reviewed by this court. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
The statements of fact by Telluride and Utah Power 
are adequate to reflect the nature of the controversy. 
They do, however, contain erroneous assertions, two of 
which involve the focal point of the case. The first 
erroneous assertion is that Utah Power has never de-
voted any of its facilities to furnishing power for distri-
bution south of Mona. This is directly contrary to the 
evidence. Telluride purchases roughly half of all the 
power distributed by it from Utah Po\ver. (R. · 198-200, 
209.) It has been connected to Utah Power's system 
since 1929. (R. 97.) The power from Utah Power is 
being distributed in Nephi today and at the time of the 
hearing and for many years prior thereto it was so dis-
tributed. The only change in this regard which would 
be brought about by affirming the Commission's order 
is that the power would be purchased at ~Iona by Nephi 
instead of being purchased at Mona by Telluride. In 
both instances the power will come from Utah Power, 
and in both cases the power so purchased will be dis-
tributed south of ~Iona. 
rrhere is considerable evidence in the. record from 
the manager of Telluride (R. 198-200, 209) and from llfr. 
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Irvine of Utah Power (R. 96-102) concerning the facili-
ties for delivering electrical energy from Utah Power to 
Telluride for distribution south of :\Iona. 1\lr. Irvine 
testified that rtah Power operates a 44 k.v. substation 
in Santaquin, rtah. This is connected directly with the 
Olmsted Hydro-electric Plant and the Hale Steam Plant 
near ProYo, rtah. These plants have a combined capac-
ity of approximately 70,000 kx. Two 44 k.v. transmission 
circuits extend from the Provo plants to the Santaquin 
substation and then extend south to :\Iona, Utah, which 
is the south boundary of r tah Power distribution system . 
. A_t ).Iona, the two -t-! k.v. transmission circuits continue 
southward but tht<y are owned by Telluride, and the 
power is taken south for distribution in Telluride's 
territory. Utah Power constructed these two 44 k.v. 
transmission circuits to 1Iona for the express purpose 
of selling large quantities of power to Telluride for dis-
tribution throughout Southern Utah. (R. 97 and 98.) 
They come to a dead end insofar as Utah Power's system 
is concerned (Ex. 1). The lines were thus designed and 
built to interconnect with Telluride's system, which dis-
tributes throughout Southern ·Utah. The assertion that 
Utah Power has never devoted any of its facilities to 
generate and deliver power for consumption in the Nephi 
area is thus directly contrary to the evidence. The only 
change eontemplated will be that Nephi must construct 
a new line from X ephi to :\Iona, and Nephi will purchase 
direct from Utah Power, rather than to have the power 
sold to Telluride and thence to Nephi. It is admitted 
that Utah Power has adequate facilities to serve any 
load which may be required by the city. {R:. 107.) 
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rl,he second erroneous assertion is that Nephi City 
is the territory of Telluride. Nephi City is a municipal 
corporation, which has availed itself of its constitutional 
and statutory right to build a municipal power plant. It 
has not sufficient generating capacity to generate all the 
power which it needs, and throughout the years it has 
purchased additional power from various sources. For 
the ten year period from 1924 to 1934, it purchased power 
under contract from the town of Levan. (R. 127.) At a 
later date (1934-1941) it purchased power from the Big 
Springs Power Company (R. 128), at Fountain Green, 
Utah, and during the past ten years it has purchased 
power from Telluride. (R. 129.) Its purchase from the 
town of Levan did not make it Levan's territory, nor did 
its purchase from Big Springs Power Company make it 
the territory of that company. rrelluride did not hesitate 
in 1941 to take over this business from Big Springs Power 
Company, nor did it apparently consider it was invading 
Big Springs' territory. Since 1903 Nephi has had its own 
plant. (R. 129.) During the first 39 years it made no pur-
chases from Telluride, although Telluride was in business 
in adjacent territories. Then in 1941, Nephi made a con-
tract with Telluride. (R. 129.) Petitioners would have 
the court believe that this contract converted Nephi into 
Telluride territory. The city of X ephi is not the territory 
of any utility. By electing to build its own plant, (as the 
cases demonstrate) Nephi is in legal contemplation as 
far removed from Telluride's territory as if it were 
located in another state. Its contract to purchase power 
from Utah Power will not convert it into the territory 
of either. It is a municipality with power to build its 
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own generating plant and distribution facilities. No 
power company could force it~ way into the city. The 
question is simply one of where it must buy its power. 
Telluride is insisting that it must buy its power from 
Telluride, (1) because it has been doing so for a period 
of ten years, and (2) Telluride is closer to Nephi than 
is Utah Power. The argument to follow will demonstrate 
that the contentions simply are not sound. 
Perhaps one additional fact should be noted. Tellu-
ride asserts at page 8 of its brief that its income has 
been reduced to the extent of $21,171.07. This is mis-
leading, although we think immaterial. The figure given 
is a gross reduction in revenue. From this figure must 
be deducted its service costs and the amount which 
Telluride would have paid to Utah Power for the power 
it would have purchased for resale to Nephi. The net 
loss is less than $5,000.00. (R. 159.) We do not think, 
however, that this has any materiality to the case. Addi-
tional facts will be developed in connection with the law 
argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. NEPHI, IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS 
POWER TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN ITS 
OWN POWER SYSTEM, IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
'rHE CONTROL OR SUPERVISION OF THE 
·PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. 
Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah provides as follows: 
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''The Legislature shall not delegate to any special 
commission, private corporation or association, 
any power to make, supervise or interfere with 
any municipal improvement, money, property or 
effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to 
levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform 
any municipal functions.'' 
The foregoing constitutional provisiOn has been 
construed by the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of 
Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 536, 
251 Pac. 961. In that case an attempt was made by the 
Public Utilities Commission of Utah to fix the rates 
charged by the City of Logan to its inhabitants for elec-
tric power, provided by their municipally owned plant. 
The Supreme Court of Utah held that a municipality has 
the right to operate its power facilities for the use and 
benefit of its inhabitants without interference or super-
vision by the Public Utilities Commission. The court 
said at page 565 of the Utah Reports : 
"We think it clear that the undoubted purpose of 
the constitutional provision is to hold inviolate 
the right of local self-government of cities and 
towns with respect to municipal improvements, 
money, property, effects, the levying of taxes, and 
the performance of municipal functions ... 
''There is still a further constitutional provision 
(Sec. 4, Art. 14) of some relevancy to the matter 
in hand, which places a limit of indebtedness on 
cities and counties not exceeding 4 per centum of 
the value of the taxable property therein, with a 
proviso, however, that any city or town may incur 
a larger indebtedness, not exceeding 4 per centum 
additional, 'for supplying such city or. town with 
water, artificial lights or sewers, when the works 
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for supplying such water, lights and sewers shall 
be ow11ed a·nd controlled by the munic·ipal·ity.' 
(Italics added) Such, we think, contemplates that 
such utilities as there Pnun1erated shall not only 
be owned, but also controlled, by the municipality, 
and as indicatiYe of a policy in harmony with the 
other constitutional provisions referred to, to hold 
inviolate the right and power of a municipality 
to do so, and that to delegate a power to a com-
mission or other agency to supervise, regulate 
and control the business of such a municipally 
owned utility, disapprove contracts, purchases, 
and expenditures of the municipality with respect 
thereto, and substitute others in lieu thereof, fix 
rate and charges under which the utility may be 
operated; and to permit the commission to do 
what it here in effect did, determine the means or 
source by or from which the operating expenses 
and bonded indebtedness of the plant or works 
must be met, constitute unauthorized interference 
with the control of the utility by the municipality. 
"We are thus of the opinion that the order made 
by the commission, insofar as it affects Logan 
City, is beyond the power and jurisdiction of the 
commission, and therefore is_ annulled and va-
cated.'' 
The Logan City case was reaffirmed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 
Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878, and reaffirmed and distinguished 
in the more recent case of Proco City u. Department of 
Business Regulation, 218 P. (2d) 675, page 678. 
In view of the foregoing constitutional provision 
and of the cases construing it, it is clearthat the P.S.C. 
has no jurisdiction to regulate a municipally-owned 
power plant. To do what petitioner~ now contend (make 
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Nephi buy from Telluride by prohibiting any other com-
pany from selling to Nephi) would by indirection do that 
which the constitution would not permit the Commission 
to do directly. 
POINT II. NEPHI IS NOT THE "TERRITORY" OF 
TELLURIDE AND THE COMMISSION HAS NO 
JURISDICTION TO C0~1PEL NEPHI TO PUR-
CHASE POWER FROM TELLURIDE. 
It is asserted by Telluride that Utah Power has been 
ordered to invade Telluride's "territory". It is also 
asserted that Utah Power could only sell to Nephi if the 
public convenience and necessity required it. Since Tellu-
ride can buy all the power Nephi needs from Utah Power, 
it can sell Nephi all the power Nephi needs. Thus it is 
argued the P.S.C. should compel Nephi to let Telluride 
broker the power to Nephi forever; its ten-year contract 
to sell power to Nephi makes Nephi Telluride's exclusive 
territory and supersedes all the constitutional provisions 
which give to Nephi "self-rule" in this field. 
The cases simply do not support any such proposi-
tion. Were we dealing with an unincorporated area 
under the direct control of the P.S.C. (as in cases cited 
by Telluride) there would be an exclusive franchise area 
which could not be invaded by a second utility unless 
the first utility could not render adequate service. Here, 
however, Nephi is not the territory of Telluride. There 
is no way Telluride could force its way into Nephi. The 
P.S.C. could not grant either Telluride or Utah Power 
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the right to distribute power in Nephi. Nor could the 
P.S.C. regulate X ephi. Nephi could build its own gen-
erating plants and not buy power from either. It could 
buy power from the Town of Levan or the city of Provo 
and the P.S.C. would have absolutely no jurisdiction over 
the contract between the rities. Its only concern here is 
to see that other customers of Utah Power are not given 
-inadeq-uate se n·ice by reason of sales to Nephi. The 
P.S.C. could not order Utah Power to sell to Nephi if 
Utah Power did not have the facilities, or coul~ only 
sell to X ephi by depriving its other customers of ade-
quate-service. Here, the power going to Nephi will come 
from Utah Power, in any event. Telluride has not con-
structed substantial new generating facilities for over 
thirty years. (R. 176.) It could only supply Nephi by 
continuing to purchase from Utah Power. Thus, it will 
not interfere with Utah Power's service to other custo-
mers to continue selling power to Nephi. In fact, Mr. 
Irvine testified that Utah Power has adequate facilities 
to furnish all the power Nephi needs or wants. (R. 107.) 
(a) 'rHE CAsEs HoLD THAT NEPHI NEED NoT BuY PowER 
FRoM THE NEAREST UTILITY, NoR PERPETUATE THE 
ExiSTING CoNTRACT. 
Fortunately, we are not here "breaking new 
ground". This problem has been before several commis-
sions and the results have been uniform in upholding 
our position. 
In a very recent case, In reUnion Electric Company 
of Missouri, 1951 P. U. R. (X.S.) 428, this identical prob-
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lem was presented to the Missouri Commission. There 
the city of Rolla had for a number of years been pur-
chasing power from Sho-Me Power Company. Its con-
tract had been terminated and was no longer in effect. 
It desired to purchase power from Union Electric Com-
pany. Sho-~Ie protested, saying that its service to Rolla 
was adequate, and that the loss of revenues would seri-
ously injure Sho-Me. Missouri, like Utah, permits cities 
to engage in supplying electricity to their inhabitants 
free from regulation by the State Commission. Prac-
tically every contention made by Telluride here was 
made by Sho-Me in the l\Iissouri case. It had for a num-
ber of years had a contract just as Telluride has had a 
contract here. The contract had ended as Telluride's 
has ended. Its service was adequate, as Telluride con-
tends that its is. The loss of revenues was assured and 
the consequences were equally as serious as are pre-
sented here. The :Missouri Commission held exactly as 
our Utah Commission has held, and in so holding said : 
''The Supreme Court in Columbia v. State Public 
Service Commission, 1931, 329 Mo. 38, 43 S.W. 
(2d) 813, has held that this Commission does not 
have authority under the law to regulate munici-
pally owned electric light plants. Since the law 
allows municipalities to own and operate electric 
plants and systems for the purpose of serving its 
inhabitants, and as such are not subject to regu-
lation by this commission, to refuse to permit a 
utility under our jurisdiction, able and willing to 
contract with the municipality to furnish service 
thereto on the sole ground that it would injure 
or harm another utility furnishing service to said 
municipality; would in effect be doing indirectly 
10 
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what the law will not permit us to do directly-
that i~, exercising jurisdiction over the territory 
within the exclusive control of the municipality. 
In order for one utility to invade the territory 
of another, it would be necessary for said utility 
to enter and serve territory belonging to the other. 
The City of Rolla and the inhabitants thereof are 
as far removed from the territory of Sho-~Ie as 
though lying in another state. :MacKay Light & 
Power Company v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power 
Company (Idaho) P.tT.R. 1920B, 4. 
"The Commission has no authority to pass on 
the decision of the city of Rolla to cease purchas-
ing its energy requirements from Sho-Me. 
"HoweYer, in this case, it can not be said that the 
city of Holla is within the allotted service area 
of either Sho-~Ie or the applicant. By virtue of 
other provisions of our statutes, the city, by its 
authorized action, has placed itself beyond the 
service area of any utility, since it has elected to 
own and operate its own electric system for the 
service of the public within its corporate limits.'' 
1,he identical problem was also presented to the 
Idaho commission in the case of MacKay Light & Power 
Compan.y v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power Company, 
P.E.R. 1920 B, page 4. 
In that case the complainant, :MacKay Light & Power 
( \_~mpany, had been granted a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity authorizing it to build a trans-
mission line from its plant near Macl(ay, Idaho, to the 
Village of Arco, and to furnish electrical energy to said 
village and territory adjacent to its transmission line. 
Holrever, the Village of Arco desired to purchase power 
11 
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from the Ashton & St. Anthony ·Power Company. That 
company had adequate power to serve the Village of 
Arco without in any way interfering with its ability to 
serve its present and prospective customers. The Vil-
lage of Arco owned and maintained a small power plant 
operated by a gas engine and such plant was inadequate 
and unsatisfactory to meet the needs of the village; and 
the people of the village had voted municipal bonds for 
the purpose of constructing an electric transmission 
line from a connection with the village system across 
MacKay Light & Power Company's territory to the sys-
tem of St. Anthony. 
In upholding the right of the village of Arco to con-
struct a transmission line through the territory of the 
.JiacKay Light & Power Company, and to purchase its 
electric energy from the latter company, the Public 
Service Commission of Idaho stated: 
''Complainant insists that defendant, by extend-
ing its lines to meet or connect with the transmis-
sion .line of the village of Arco, even tho11gh such 
extension is entirely within territory allotted to 
defendant by the Commission, is invading or at-
tempting to invade the territory covered by the 
certificate of complainant, thus doing or attempt-
ing to do, indirectly what it cannot lawfully do 
directly; that since there is no demand for electric 
energy for use within defendant's territory to be 
delivered at the point where complainant desires 
to connect its proposed transmission line with the 
defendant's, any action taken by defendant with 
the intent and purpose of assisting the village of 
Arco in securing electric energy to be used within 
:the territory· covered by complainant's certificate 
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is an unlawful invasion of said territory. On the 
other hand, it may be argued that sitH'l' the law 
allows municipalities to own and operate electric 
plants and systems and specifically exempts them 
from the jurisdiction of the commission, the com-
mission, by refusing to permit defendant to fur-
nish electric energy to the village of Arco on the 
ground that such enel'KY is to be used within the 
complainant's territory, is doing indirectly what 
the law says it may not do directly-that is, exer-
cising jurisdiction over the territory within the 
exclusive control of the municipality. On the 
broad grounds that the best interests of the public 
generally in the regard of territories allotted to 
complainant and defendant by the Commission, 
will best be served by requiring that all the de-
mand for electric energy in such territory be sup-
plied by the utility authorized to operate in that 
field or territory, it would appear that the Com-
mission might refuse to permit any current to be 
carried without the limits of the territory which 
the Commission, in the exercise of its judgment, 
has assigned to a particular utility. We cannot, 
however, escape the conclusion that the legisla-
ture, in exempting municipalities from the juris-
diction of the Commission intended to remove the 
territory within the municipality from control of 
the commission as completely and effectively as 
if it had taken such territory bodily and set it 
down without the confines of the other.'' 
The Commission, therefore, held: 
''That the defendant should not be restrained 
and enjoined from entering into a contract to fur-
nish or sell and deliver to the village of Arco 
electric energy at any point within territory cov-
ered by ·the certificate of convenience and neces-
sity issued to said defendant by the Commission, 
13 
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to. be carried over a transmission line owned by 
said village for the exclusive use of said village 
within its corporate limits." 
We have quoted rather extensively from the case 
involving the Village of Arco, because it so perfectly 
parallels the situation here. The Idaho Public Service 
Commission confirmed the. right of the Village of Arco 
to by-pass the closest utility and to go clear through its 
territory to acquire power from the Ashton & St. Anthony 
Power Company. For the same reasons and considera-
tions, the city of Nephi has the right to by-pass the Tellu-
ride Power Company and purchase the power it needs 
from the Utah Power & Light Company. 
Another case equally in point is Village District of 
Belmont v. LaConia Gas and Electric Co. (New Hamp-
shire) P.U.R. 1925 C, page 349. There a city had been 
buying power from the Tilton Electric Light Company. 
The city board decided, when its contract expired, to buy 
power from LaConia Gas & Electric Co. The latter 
company refused to sell to the city, because Tilton had 
b_een serving the town, and Tilton had adequate facilities 
_to cont.i.nue so to do. Tilton intervened and proved that 
the loss of revenue would be serious, and that it was will-
ing and anxious to continue to serve the town. Again 
we have a direct parallel, in· tliat there was an existing 
contract with the first utility, it was rendering adequate 
serv!ce. and the· joss of revenlleS. wo~ld ·be· serious. The 
~~:~:co~~,·.'!l!Hity .(like: Utah P6wer)· :did not. want to sen·e 
~li~:~ to~n.-:· ·st~lf~ _the Commission·_. _required the second 
ntU.ity fq rgnq~r ~~ryice to .t4e ·_t«J.w~.: 
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8ee also Toll'J/ of J{caruy r. Passaic Cousolida!l'd 
Trater Company, 19::!3 B P.lT.H., page --l-:~7. There a town 
had by contraet purchased water from the New Jersey 
Suburban \Yater Company. Its contract expired. The 
town desired to· discontinue purchasing from that com-
pany and to eommenee purchasing from Passaic Con-
solidated \Yater Company. Both the first and the second 
companies were regulated utilities. The facts showed 
that the Xew Jersey Suburban \Vater Company was 
buying water from Passaic and reselling it at an in-
creased price to the town. By making the purchase and 
resale, Xew Jersey Suburban Water Company was able 
to render· adequate service. It had a big investment in 
facilities which we.re constructed to permit delivery of 
the water to the town. The loss of the town as a customer 
would greatly lessen the value of the facilities. Never-
theless, the Commission held that the town was not re-
quired to continue to buy from New Jersey Suburban 
Water Company, which desired to continue to serve the 
town. The Commission, therefore, ordered Passaic to 
permit the connection. 
All of- these cases are in point with the decision of 
the P.S.C. here. It is- no-t possible to spell out any sub-
stanthll difference in any one of them. They are in har-
mony with lhe Utah Supreme Court~ruling which accords 
to X ephi ·the right to operate its own Blectrical distribu-
tiOli s·ysterri, free from~ the:~ control of. the Public. S.ervice 
Commissicm .. : If: the COJ;nniission is_ permitte!} to shut off 
every other availa.ble ~source of electrical energy, it ~an 
.G·ompeY by. .. :in-dii:ectio:n. the_ purchase of powe:x: fro~ _Tellu-
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ride. It could thue in violation of the constitution award 
Nephi to Telluride. Telluride asks the Court to do this, 
because Telluride allegedly needs the revenues. 
(b) 'f:aE NEED oF TELLURIDE FoR ADDITIONAL REVENUES 
Is IMMATERIAL To THE IssuEs INvoLVED IN THis CAsE. 
The cases cited above under subdivision (a) hereof 
have uniformly held that the loss of revenues by a par-
ticular utility has no bearing whatsoever on the question 
of whether a town or city can buy from a different source. 
If Nephi elected to build its own generating plant, it 
could do so without Public Service Commission approval. 
See cases under Point I. Telluride would thus lose the 
revenue and no agency would have any power to do any-
thing about it. Telluride could not force its way into 
Nephi City. If Telluride really needs the business, and 
this is grounds for the Public Service Commission to 
indirectly regulate cities, Telluride's weak financial posi-
tion should be bolstered by letting it broker power to 
some of the other cities in the state too. The P.S.C. has 
no authority to make any city subsidize Telluride. Tellu-
ride has no vested right to broker power to Nephi or 
Provo or any other city in the state. It would, of course, 
be serious as far as public utilities are concerned if all 
of the cities of the state elected to go into the electrical 
power business. Utah Power would be seriously injured 
if Salt Lake City made that decision. Still, the constitu-
tion would permit Salt Lake City to do so, notwithstand-
ing the consequent loss of power revenues to Utah Power. 
If every city and town in the state took advantage of its 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
constitutional powers, it might wPll be that all utilities 
in the state ·would "fold up", but this still does not 
change the fact that the constitution has placed this right 
in all eitic's and towns, as was pointed out by the court 
in the Log a 11 City case, supra. The matter of public con-
venience and necessity is not controlling insofar as cities 
are concerned. The only reason that this matter is before 
the P.S.C. at all is that X ephi is seeking to purchase 
from a regulated utility. If a sale by that utility would 
seriously impair its ability to serve present and pros-
pective customers, the P.S.C. should prohibit the con-
nection. In the relatively recent case of North Salt Lake 
r. St. Joseph 1r a fer &; Irrigation Company, (Utah) 223 
P. (2d) 577, the court upheld a restriction by the P.S.C. 
on new connections, even ·within the franchise area of 
St. Joseph. Under that case Utah Power could even be 
prohibited from connecting one new customer in the very 
heart of its territory if its existing customers could not 
be adequately served with the ~ompan.y 's existing capaci-
ties. Therefore, no regulated utility C<?uld be r.equired 
to sell to any new customer either within or without its 
territory, if a sale to such additional customer would 
impair its ability to serve its existing customers. This 
is the only consideration for the P.S.C. In this case the 
record would permit no other conclusion than the one 
reached by the P.S.C. That is, that Utah Power has 
ample facilities to supply :Nephi City. (R. 107.) In fact, 
even if petitioners prevail, Nephi's power will come from 
Utah Power through Telluride to Nephi. Since it will 
not impair Utah Power's ability to serve its existing or 
potential customers, the P.S.C. should not attempt to 
17 
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prohibit Utah Power from selling to any city and to 
thereby compel the city to buy from Telluride or some 
other source. As the Missouri Commission said in the 
Union Electric Co. case, Nephi is in legal contemplation 
as far removed from Telluride's territory as if it were 
in another state. 
See also Alaba.ma Power Co. v. Guntersville, 117 So. 
332, 114 A.L.R. 181, 193, and People v. City of Lovelood, 
(Colo.) 230 P. 399, which holds that a city can not be 
deprived of its power to control its own affairs by the 
fact that a regulated utility has invested large sums in 
supplying facilities to serve the city. The court said: 
''To hold contrary would assert that no compe-
tition in the furnishing of light, power, gas, water 
and kindred matters, should be allowed once a 
plant has been provided to supply any of them.'' 
(c) THERE CAN BE No QuEsTION CoNCERNING THE PowER 
oF A CITY To BuiLD ITs LINES TO PmNTS BEYOND ITs 
CITY LIMITS. 
It has been already held by the Utah Supreme Court 
that a city may construct lines and build generating 
equipment beyond its city limits. The problem was 
squarely raised in the case of Muir r. "Afurray City, 55 
Utah 368, 186 Pac. 433. In that case the city of :Murray 
borrowed money from ~uir for the purpose of construct-
ing an electric transmission line from Murray to the 
community of Granite, which was about seven miles 
beyond the -Murray city limits. The city attempted to 
avoid paying the obligation, by contending that it did 
18 
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not have the right to incur an obligation for that purpose. 
In holding to the contrary the court said: 
''In the case at bar the ei ty had the power to 
establish an electric light plant and transmission 
line beyond its boundaries, if 1wressary, for the 
purpose of supplying light for itself and inhabi-
tants. Com. Laws of Utah 1917, Section 570x2. 
It had the power to purchase water rights for 
that purpose and pay in cash or by furnishing 
power in exchange therefor." 
Also, in North Salt Lake l'. St. Joseph TVater & Irri.-
gation Company, supra, 223 P. (2d) 577, the court up-
held the right of the Town of North Salt Lake to condemn 
the water system of St. Joseph. S t. Joseph was a regu-
lated utility with water rights and facilities in part be-
yond the city limits. 
POI~T III. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
DID XOT REQUIRE UTAH POWER TO REN-
DER SERVICE IN AN AREA TO WHICH IT 
H.A.S NOT DEDICATED ITS PROPERTY. 
Both Utah Power and Telluride have contended that 
Utah Po\ver has been required to dedicate its facilities 
to serve an area which it has never served and does not 
desire to serve. This is wrong as a factual matter, be-
cause the record shows that Utah Power has constructed 
facilities for delivering power to Mona from whence it 
can be transmitted to others for use throughout Southern 
Utah. It is wrong as a legal matter, because the P.S.C. 
order contemplates that Nephi will come to Utah Power's 
lines for its connection .. 
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(a) UTAH PowER HAs DEDICATED ITs FACILITIEs FoR 
GENERATING AND TRANSMITTING PowER To MoNA FoR 
UsE IN SouTHERN UTAH. 
Whether a public utility has professed to serve a 
given area is a question of fact, rather than a question 
of law; see United Puel v. P.S.C., 105 West Virginia 603, 
144 S.E. 723. 
ln view of .Mr. Irvine's testimony, there can be little 
merit to this contention by Utah Power. :Mr. Irvine testi-
fied that in an agreement with Telluride executed on 
July 3, 1929, U tali Power constructed an interconnecting 
transmission line from the Santaquin substation of Utah 
Power to the Gunnison substation of ·Telluride. Utah 
Power has supplied Telluride power through these lines 
since November 1, 1929. (R. 98.) On August 5, 1949, 
Telluride purchased a portion of the line. Another trans-
mission line between the Hale and Olmsted plants, near 
Provo, and ~Iona was constructed by Utah Power to 
meet and connect with Telluride's lines at :Mona for the 
purpose of supplying additional power to Telluride. (R. 
98.) At that time Telluride was serving Nephi. (R. 146.) 
It is thus clear that Utah Power constructed two 44 k.v. 
lines to :Moua for the express and sole purpose of supply-
ing power to territories in Utah south of :Mona, including 
consumption by the inhabitants of Nephi. There is no 
substation at l\iona, (R. 103) and distribution would not 
be made direct to houses enroute from a 44 k.v.line. Both 
petitioners desire to have this court assure to Telluride 
the continued right to serve Nephi with power purchased 
from r tah Power. No new transmission ·lines are. going 
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to be built by rtah Power. The connection is going to 
be made in rtah Power's territory. The power is going 
to go south to X ephi, as it has done since 1941, except 
that now X ephi will have its o\\·n transmission line, 
rather than use Telluride's. There is no difference what-
ever in principle between giving Telluride a connection 
with Utah Power's territory and giving Nephi a con-
nection in Utah Power's territory. 
Throughout Utah Power's brief it talks about where 
it has ''served'' in the past. It says it has never served 
the territory south of :Jiona. If the word ''served'' is 
used in its technical sense, Utah Power is correct. It has 
generated electrical energy and transmitted it to Mona 
for use throughout Southern Utah, but it has not served 
the territory south of :Mona. Po,cver generated by Utah 
Power has been distributed to Nephi, but Utah Power 
has not "served" the inhabitants of Nephi. Its service 
ends at :Mona, where it delivers the electrical energy to 
Telluride, or where it will deliver to Nephi as said by the 
Commission in Wis. State R.E.A. vs. Wis. Gas & Electric 
Co., 17 P.U.R. ~.S. 31, "The company's obligations end 
when it delivers the energy.'' Nephi serves its own in-
habitants, and Telluride serves its territory with power 
purchased from Utah Power in Utah Power's territory. 
The eases cited by Utah Power and Telluride do not pro-
hibit or even suggest that Nephi can not come to Utah 
Power's territory and purchase power. Utah Power has 
surplus electrical energy for sale. It will deliver the same 
within its own territory as it is now doing. The only 
change will be that it has changed customers. Its obliga-
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tions in regard to this electrical energy will end at the 
point where it delivers the energy to Nephi. This point 
will be well within its territory. It is not being required to 
extend its lines or to construct new lines into new terri-
tories. If Nephi were attempting to compel Utah Power 
to build a seven mile transmission line to Nephi, and in 
addition to build a retail distribution system throughout 
Nephi and to read the meters, hire employees, to service 
and maintain the lines, etc., then Utah Power might com-
plain that it was being required to extend service into 
new territories. Here, however, it is simply being re-
quired to deliver electrical energy at Mona where it 
presently is in business and where it presently is selling 
to one customer. There is no logical reason why, if it 
'has the facilities to do so, it should not also sell to a 
second or a third customer. Not a single case cited by 
either petitioner is contrary to this proposition. 
POINT IV. THE PETITIONERS' AUTHORITIES 
. The court will instantly recognize the basic distinc-
tion between the present case and all of the cases cited 
_by petitioners. Here Nephi is not in fact or legal con-
templation the territory of either Telluride or Utah 
Power. It is a city _which has been placed by our consti-
tution beyond the territory of either. It is in the langu-
age of the cases an "island" or "no man's land". It 
was this consideration which led the Missouri Commis-
sion to hold in the case of In re Union Electric Company 
of Missouri, supra, 1951 P.U.R. (N.S.) 428, that: 
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'' ... It cannot be said that the city of Rolla is 
within the allotted serYire area of either Sho-Me 
or the applicant. By Yirtne of other provisions 
of our statutes, the rity, by its authorized action, 
has placed itself beyond the service area of any 
utility .... '' 
The same distinction was noted in the MacKay Light 
& Pou·er Company r. Ashton&; St. Anthony Power Cum-
pan y, P. u .R. 1920 B, page 4, where the Commission said : 
'' ... \Ye cannot, however, escape the conclusion 
that the legislature, in exempting municipalities 
from the jurisdiction of the Commission intended 
to remove the territory within the municipality 
from control of the commission as completely and 
effectively as if it had taken such territory bodily 
and set it down without the confines of the other." 
See also Behnke v. lVisconsin Gas & Electric Co., 
1936, 15 P.U.R. (N.S.) 217, wherein the Commission 
ordered a utility into a "no man's land" to serve a terri-
tory which was not the admitted territory of either 
utility. 
There is not a single case cited by petitioners which 
involves a similar principle. Each one involves two 
regulated utilities ''Tith allotted territories, and the courts 
and commissions have correctly held that one utility may 
not invade the allotted territory of a second utility. If 
Nephi were attempting to purchase power for resale 
beyond its city limits in Telluride's territory, we think 
a similar holding would have to be reached here. But 
where Nephi is going to resell only to its own inhabi-
tants, it is distributing the power in its own territory 
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and is not infringing Telluride's territory at all. For 
example, in Mulcahy v. P.S.C., 101 Utah 245, 117 P. (2d) 
298, (cited at page 8 of Telluride's brief) the Fuller-
'foponce Truck Co. was granted a certificate to operate 
as a common motor carrier between Salt Lake City and 
Logan. Mulcahy, representing the Utah Idaho Central 
Railroad Company, and other transportation companies, 
objected to the issuance. 
The Indiana case also cited on page 8 deals with 
two public utilities, with one attempting to enter the 
territory served by the other. 
In the In re Bayles case, cited by Telluride on page 
10, eighteen individuals wanted an operating permit to 
operate in the territory allotted to Dixie Power Com-
pany. They were going to buy their power from Parowan 
City for distribution and consumption outside the city 
limits ~nd in the territory of the Dixie Power Company. 
So again there is. an attempt on the part of one group 
(not a city) to obtain an operating permit in the allotted 
territory of another. In re Streeper, cited on page 11 of 
rrelluride 's brief, on.e truck company wanted to compete 
with other carriers. between Salt Lake City and Ogden. 
This again is an attempt by one utility to operate in the 
allotted territory of another. We could go on through 
each other case cited by Telluride, but they can perhaps 
be equally well covered by the statement that in each 
one of them an established territory of one regulated 
utility was intended to be invaded by another regulated 
utility; The whole basis of the petitioner's argument is 
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that X ephi is 'l\,lluride 's allotted territory. Petitioner::.; 
fail completely to tell the court who allotted Nephi to 
Telluride, or how Xephi became rrelluride'::.; tl•lTitory. 
It is clear from the record that prior to 1941 Telluride 
liad no interest whatever in X ephi. As early as 1903 
X ephi was generating electrical energy and distributing 
the same to its inhabitants. (R. 129.) Xo agency has 
e\·er made any order allotting X ephi to Telluride. Its 
only right in connection \Yith ~ ephi came to it by contract 
in 1941. Its rights are purely contractual, not vested 
or inalienable. The rights having come to it by contract, 
expired when the contract expired. There are, of course, 
situations where rights are superimposed by statute 
upon individuals by reason of their having made a con-
tract. For example, the obligations of workmen's com-
pensation are imposed on the employer-employee con-
tract. \Ve, thus, recognize that from certain contractual 
obligations there arise other duties over and beyond 
those covered by the contract. In those instances, how-
ever, there is a statute which operates on the contractual 
arrangement. In the instant case, the petitioners do not 
point to any statute which expressly, or by implication, 
or at all, says that once a city has purchased power from 
a utility the city becomes the territory of that utility. 
In fact, no such statute could be constitutionally enacted. 
In short, the petitioners simply assume that because 
X ephi once made a contract to purchase power from Tel-
luride, Telluride acquired certain inalienable and vested 
rights, which did not expire when the contract expired. 
Having once had a contract with Nephi, it forever has 
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the inalienable and vested right to sell power to Nephi. 
The legal procedures or theories establishing this prin-
ciple are not listed at all by either petitioner. Appar-
ently, petitioners operate upon the theory that if asserted 
often enough, the proposition will become sound. Once 
there is stripped from their argument the premise that 
Nephi is Telluride's territory, the entire argument must 
fall. There is not a single case cited by either petitioner 
to show that Nephi is Telluride's territory. There is not 
a single authority cited to support the proposition that 
this contract which has expired gave Telluride vested 
and inalienable rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the constitution of the State of Utah, Nephi 
may undertake to furnish and distribute electrical energy 
to its inhabitants. Nephi has availed itself of this con-
stitutional right. It has since 1903 been furnishing power 
to its people, some through its own generating facilities 
and some through purchase from the town of Levan, 
from the Big Springs Power Company, and from Tellu-
ride. Its contract to purchase electrical energy from 
third parties did :not abrogate its right to serve its own 
territory .. Its purchase contracts did not give Telluride 
a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate in 
Nephi City. The city is free to build its own generating 
plant or to purchase· power wherever power is available. 
Telluride's rights are· purely contractual-not inherent 
or inalienable. Its contract has expired and Telluride's 
right expii·ed with iL 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The cases all hold that Xephi has no obligation to 
renew its contract "·ith Telluride, nor to purchase its 
power from the nearest utility. rrhe loss of revenue to 
Telluride by the expiration of its contract is of no con-
eern. Prior to 19-±1 it did not ha,·e these revenues aud 
no right to have the P.S.C. compel Nephi to contract with 
it. Its rights came into existence by contract in 1941, and 
expired with the contract in 1951. Utah Power is in busi-
ness as a public utility offering to serve all customers 
within its territory. X ephi, as a separate legal entity and 
a customer like any other municipality in Utah Power's 
entire territory, and like Telluride, wants to connect to 
rtah Power's system 'dthin Utah Power's territory. 
Utah Power's obligation will end the moment it delivers 
the power to Nephi. It would not be required to service 
Xephi's lines, to read meters in Nephi City, or to do any-
thing else beyond the point where it delivers energy to 
Xephi. That point will be on Utah Power's existing sys-
tem within its existing territory. It will simply be selling 
to two customers at :\Iona, instead of one. Both of its 
customers will take power purchased at :Mona south for 
distribution and service in their respective territories. 
Nephi will serve within the city limits of Nephi and Tellu-
ride will serve its franchise area. There is no additional 
burden placed on Utah Power. It will not be required to 
geuerate any more power, the power generated will not go 
in any different direction. It has ample facilities to con-
nect this new customer to its system. It can serve this 
new customer without in any way impairing its service 
to others. There is no legal ground whatever for its 
refusing to do so. Were this court to hold otherwise it 
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would be directing the P .S.C. to unconstitutionally regu-
late Nephi's affairs. The P.S.C. could not by any direct 
order compel Nephi to do business with Telluride. It 
must not by indirection do that which the constitution 
forbids. 
The brief of Telluride advances the proposition that 
Nephi City and all of the cities of Southern Utah, within 
the area served by it, must forever and a day pay to it 
or some brokerage power company its twenty-five per 
cent commission for buying and distributing electrical 
energy from Utah Power. For over twenty-five years 
within the memory of counsel said cities in Southern Utah 
have cried for some industrial development. Today as 
for the past twenty-five years Nephi City and said cities 
of Southern Utah are met with the answer by new indus~ 
tries seeking to locate here, "Your power costs are too 
high", we shall have to locate within the area served by 
Utah Power. And that industry has done. Thus, at least 
in part, ··have the commercial streams of community 
building been turned from the doors of Southern Utah. 
Nephi _City fee1s it is grossly urijust that it, and other 
adjacent cities of Southern Utah, have thus been sen-
tenced to serve a withering, drying up life process. We 
feel we are entitled to make the best arrangement which 
can be made to aid Nephi City to grow, and to obtain 
cheaper, m?re reliable power is one of the important 
m_usts to permit it to grow. Without the granting of the 
petition _it can not compete with its neighboring cities on 
the _north~ 
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~ We respectfully submit that the order of the P.'S.C. 
~ should be affirmed, and that Nephi should be awarded 
It its costs against both petitioners. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
UDELL R. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Nephi City 
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